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In recent years, quantum cryptography has been developed into the continuous variable framework
where it has been shown to fully exploit the potentialities of quantum optics. In this framework, we
introduce novel “transform and measure” protocols which generalize and are proven to outperform
the previous “prepare and measure” protocols. In these new protocols the secret information is
encoded via random unitary transformations onto a quantum state which is transmitted forward
and backward by the trusted parties. Thanks to this multiple quantum communication, Alice and
Bob make an iterated use of the uncertainty principle which leads to a security enhancement. In
particular, the security threshold is shown to behave like a superadditive quantity over multiple
uses of the quantum channel. Our analysis investigates the simplest and non-trivial transform and
measure protocols (i.e., the ones based on two-way quantum communication) whose security is tested
against Gaussian attacks.
Recently quantum information has discovered the non-
trivial advantages offered by continuous variable systems,
i.e., quantum systems described by a set of observables,
like position and momentum, having a continuous spec-
trum of eigenvalues [1, 2]. Accordingly, quantum key
distribution has been extended to this new framework
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] and cryptographic protocols based
on coherent states have been proved to be very power-
ful for their experimental feasibility [11, 12]. In these
quantum key distribution protocols, Alice prepares a co-
herent state |γ〉 whose amplitude γ = (Q+iP )/2 encodes
two random variablesQ and P following two independent
Gaussian distributions (having zero mean and the same
large variance). Then, Alice sends the state to Bob, who
measures it in order to retrieve the encoded information.
As depicted in Fig. 1, such a measurement can be:
(a1) a single observable measurement Q or P , randomly
chosen by Bob (this measurement is called homo-
dyne detection of quadrature Q or P );
(b1) a joint observables measurement Q and P (this
measurement is called heterodyne detection, and it
is equivalent to a balanced beam splitter followed
by two homodyne detectors).
In both protocols, Alice and Bob finally share pairs of
correlated continuous variables from which they can ex-
tract a secret binary key via slicing techniques of phase
space [13]. This classical stage is called reconciliation and
can be direct if Bob estimates Alice’s original variables
or reverse if Alice estimates Bob’s outcomes [14].
Even if these protocols belong to the so-called prepare
and measure (PM) schemes, they can be equivalently
formulated in terms of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
schemes, where Alice and Bob extract a secret key from
the correlated outcomes of the measurements made upon
a shared EPR source. This source is realized by a two-










FIG. 1: One-way quantum cryptography with coherent states.
In both protocols, Alice prepares a coherent state with ran-
dom amplitude γ = (Q+ iP )/2 to be sent to Bob. Then, in
protocol (a1), Bob randomly measures quadrature Q or P via
a homodyne detector, while, in protocol (b1), Bob performs
a joint measurement of Q and P via a balanced beam splitter
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where Z ≡ diag(1,−1), I the 2×2 identity matrix, and V
is a variance characterizing the source and connected to
the squeezing parameter (V = cosh 2r) [15]. One can eas-
ily show that heterodyning one mode of this EPR source
is equivalent to the remote preparation of a coherent state
whose amplitude γ is randomly modulated by a Gaussian
of variance V − 1 (see Appendix). The EPR formulation
of the protocol (a1) is depicted in Fig. 2 where the attack
of a potential eavesdropper, Eve, is also shown. Ref. [11]
showed that the optimal attack against this protocol is
2given by a Gaussian quantum operation (Gaussian at-
tack) based on the so-called entangling cloner. In this
attack, each signal sent from Alice to Bob (mode B) is
mixed with a probe (mode E), via a beam splitter of
transmission T . This probe is part of an EPR source
with variance W which is in Eve’s hands. At the end of
the protocol, when Bob reveals the basis (Q or P ) chosen
for each run, Eve will consequently perform the appro-
priate homodyne measurements (Q or P ) on her output
modes E′ and E′′. From such measurements, Eve will in-
fer about Alice’s variable (direct reconciliation) or Bob’s
variable (reverse reconciliation). An entangling cloner
attack can be therefore characterized by two parameters,
transmission T and variance W , which can be arranged
in the unique quantity
Σ ≡W (1− T )T−1 , (2)
representing the variance of the Gaussian noise added
to the channel. These quantities are evaluated by Alice
and Bob by publishing part of their correlated continu-
ous variables QB′ and Q+, or PB′ and P− (see Fig. 2).
In this way, they perform an error analysis of the channel
[16], which reconstructs the correlation matrixV′ of their
shared Gaussian state ρAB′ and therefore their mutual in-
formation IAB = I(QB′ , Q+) (see Appendix). Similarly,
they can evaluate IAE and IBE , and therefore the two
key-rates [17, 18] IAB − IAE (direct reconciliation) and
IAB − IBE (reverse reconciliation). The security thresh-
olds achieved for high modulation (V → +∞) are equal
to Σ = 1 for direct reconciliation, and to Σ = T−1 > 1
for reverse reconciliation. In particular, for direct rec-
onciliation, the optimal attack is given by an entangling
cloner with W = 1, i.e., a beam splitter (lossy channel
attack). In such a case, the threshold simply corresponds
to T = 1/2, i.e., 3 dB of losses [9]. Similar results [10]















FIG. 2: Optimal attack against the protocol (a1) (see text
for explanation). The dashed line displays a black-box, with
an EPR source and a heterodyne detector inside, which Alice
can use to prepare a randomly displaced coherent state |γ〉 .
Even if the underlying physical principles are the same,
different protocols are able to exploit them with different
performances. For this reason, existing security thresh-
olds can be outperformed by a more clever use of the
uncertainty principle. In particular, we show that secu-
rity enhancement can be achieved at the cost of multi-
ple quantum communications between the trusted par-
ties, implying an iterated use of the uncertainty prin-
ciple. Within this approach, Bob prepares a quantum
state to be sequentially transmitted forward and back-
ward by Alice and Bob in a sort of ‘multi-way’ quantum
communication (N rounds). In this case, the classical
information is encoded via random unitary transforma-
tions on this state by the two trusted parties. At the
end of the process, one of the two parties can access the
information of the other one (the signal) by subtracting
their own known transformation (the reference), while a
third unauthorized party needs to access both sets of
transformations in order to achieve the same encoded
information. We call such novel schemes transform and
measure (TM) protocols and they can be seen as a gener-
alization of the earlier PM protocols, which were limited
to a single direction.
Here, we explicitly consider TM protocols which are
based on a two-way quantum communication (N = 2)
and that suitably extend the previous one-way protocols
(a1) and (b1). In order to simplify their comparison,
we consider direct reconciliation in the high modulation
limit (V → +∞). As depicted in Fig. 3, we may design
three different types of two-way protocols:
(a2) the “homodyne” protocol (a2) extends (a1) to
two-way quantum communication. Here, Bob has
an EPR source (with variance V ), of which he
keeps a mode r while he sends the other refer-
ence mode R to Alice. Then, Alice randomly dis-
places this mode in phase-space, i.e., she applies a
displacement operator [15] D(γ) whose amplitude







= V and 〈QP 〉 = 〈Q〉 = 〈P 〉 = 0. Fi-
nal mode B is then sent back to Bob. This mode
contains Alice’s signal γ, since its quadratures are
equal to QB = QR + Q and PB = PR + P . In or-
der to access this signal, Bob homodynes his modes
r and B by choosing to measure their position or
momentum at random. For instance, he can decide
to measure positions Qr and QB, so that he can
construct an optimal estimator of QR (from Qr)
and, then, an estimator Q(B) of Q = QB − QR.
Symmetrically, he can measure Pr and PB to infer
about P . The basis chosen for each run of the pro-
tocol will be classically communicated to Alice at
the end of all the quantum communications, when
the two trusted parties will share pairs of correlated
continuous variables {Q,Q(B)} and {P, P (B)}.
(b2) As for one-way protocols, Bob can attempt a joint
measurement of quadratures Q and P . This is
achieved in the “heterodyne” protocol (b2) which
3extends (b1) to two-way quantum communication.
Here, Bob heterodynes his modes r and B, from
whose results he infers about the full signal (Q,P )
of Alice. In this case, the protocol is deterministic,
in the sense that it does not need any final basis
revelation by Bob. Note that this protocol can be
fully implemented with coherent states. In fact,
by heterodyning mode r, Bob randomly prepares a
coherent state |Γ〉 = D(Γ) |0〉 which is sent to Al-
ice. This state is a reference state which contains
the reference random transformation Γ known to
Bob. By applying her random displacement D(γ),
Alice transforms this state into another coherent
state |Γ + γ〉 which is sent back to Bob via mode
B. By the subsequent heterodyne detection, Bob
is able to estimate the total amplitude Γ + γ and,
therefore, to infer about γ from the knowledge of
Γ. As we have mentioned before, we expect that
security threshold sensibly improves since Eve has
to estimate both the reference Γ and the masked
signal Γ + γ in order to access the signal γ. This
implies both a perturbation of the forward chan-
nel (mode R) and a perturbation of the backward
channel (mode B), and, since the first perturbation
will also affect the backward channel, we will intu-
itively expect a security threshold more than dou-
ble the one we had in the one-way case. Of course,
this superadditive behavior of the threshold must
be carefully verified, considering that, in the pro-
posed two-way quantum cryptography, eavesdrop-
ping strategies are more complex and Eve has non-
trivial possibilities to connect the attacks on the
forward and the backward channels.
(c2) On the other hand, these new connection possibili-
ties hold also for Bob, who may join his modes r and
B before the measurement. In fact, the previous
protocol can be modified into a sort of dense cod-
ing protocol where Bob performs a Bell-type mea-
surement on modes r and B. This measurement
is achieved by inserting these modes into a beam
splitter with suitable transmission G and, then, by
homodyning the output ports. At the end of the
paper, we will discuss this protocol in more detail.
In a general cryptographic scenario, the trusted parties
evaluate Eve’s attack via suitable measurements on the
quantum channel, whose outcomes are then used for a
subsequent classical analysis of the errors. For these
new protocols, Alice and Bob must monitor both the
forward and the backward channels. This is achieved if
Alice randomly switches from previously described key-
distribution stages, also known as key modes or message
modes, to “tomographic” stages, also known as control
modes [20, 21]. During a control mode, Alice does not en-
code any information, but detects reference mode R and
sends a new reference mode R˜ back to Bob, which is then
detected in the usual way (i.e., according to the message
mode of the protocol). In particular, in (a2) Alice ho-
modynes R and sends R˜ using a new EPR source, while,
in (b2) and (c2), it is sufficient for Alice to perform het-
erodyne detection and prepare a returning coherent state.
In this way, Alice and Bob are able perform two distinct
error analyses, of the forward and backward channels, by




























FIG. 3: Two-way quantum cryptography. Three different
transform and measure protocols, based on two-way quan-
tum communication, are displayed in message mode (see text
for explanation).
As already said, eavesdropping of two-way quantum
cryptography is more difficult to study since Eve may
adopt strategies which exploit correlations among the for-
ward and the backward channels. Consider then the pro-
tocol (a2), and let us derive the optimal attack which can
be derived by combining the optimal attacks of the corre-
sponding one-way protocol (a1). If we label the forward
and backward channels by i = 1, 2 respectively, then we
must combine two entangling cloners with free parame-
ters T1,W1 and T2,W2 (i.e., added noises Σ1 and Σ2).
By homodyning their outputs in the correct basis, Eve
4constructs an optimal estimator Q(E) (or P (E)) of Alice’s
variable, which enables her to share a mutual informa-
tion IAE = (1/2) ln(V/VA|E) [22], where the conditional
variance VA|E ≡ VQ|Q(E) = VP |P (E) quantifies Eve’s re-
maining uncertainty on Alice’s variable. Similarly, Bob’s
estimator Q(B) (or P (B)) leaves him with a conditional
variance VA|B ≡ VQ|Q(B) = VP |P (B) . For high modula-
tion (V → +∞) and non-trivial attacks (Ti 6= 0, 1), one
computes
VA|B =




T2(1 − T1)W−12 + (1− T2)W−11
(1− T1)(1 − T2) . (4)
The optimal attack can be identified by the minimum of
VA|BVA|E , so that Eve minimizes the perturbation on the
channel (VA|B) while she maximizes the acquired infor-
mation (inverse of VA|E). Such product takes the mini-
mum value VA|BVA|E = 4 for
W2 = 1 and T2 = [1 + (1 − T1)W1]−1, (5)
which corresponds to considering an entangling cloner
with free parameters (T1,W1) on the forward channel,
followed by a beam splitter with a correlated transmission
T2 = f(T1,W1) on the backward channel (see Fig. 4). In
order to support the optimality of this attack, consider
the singular case T1 = T2 = 1. In such a case, Eve is
excluded and Bob performs the best possible estimation
strategy to evaluate Alice’s relevant transformation. The
same strategy would hold for Eve in the other singular
case T1 = T2 = 0 where Bob is excluded. In the non-
trivial cases Ti 6= 0, 1, the considered attack mixes these
two optimal estimation strategies via a suitable Gaussian
transformation.
In order to derive the security threshold we impose
IAB = IAE which is equivalent to VA|B = VA|E . By
using Eqs. (3), (4) and (5), we get W1 = (1 − T1)−1 and
T2 = 1/2. These parameters characterize the curve of
the threshold attacks which have a total noise equal to
Σ ≡ Σ1 +Σ2 = 1 + T−11 . (6)
It follows that the two-way security threshold satisfies
Σ > 2, and therefore it is more than doubling the thresh-
old Σ = 1 of the corresponding one-way protocol. Thanks
to this superadditivity, two-way quantum cryptography
brings a non-trivial security improvement. In fact, even
when the communication channel is too noisy for one-
way quantum key distribution to be secure, it can still
be used to provide secure quantum key distribution using
our two-way scheme.
In order to further support this superadditivity, we
study the powerful attacks based on pure losses. In two-
way quantum cryptography a lossy channel attack is re-
alized by using two beam splitters with suitable trans-
























FIG. 4: Optimal attack against the protocol (a2). It con-
sists of an entangling cloner attack on the forward channel,
followed by a beam splitter attack on the backward channel.
We have a lossy channel attack if we remove the dashed box
in the figure.
publicized by Bob, Eve homodynes their output ports E′1
and E′2 to infer about the signal. Since two beam split-
ters are two entangling cloners with W1 =W2 = 1, from








(1− T1)(1− T2) . (8)
Then, from VA|B = VA|E we get the threshold curve for
this kind of attack, to be
T2 = (1 − T1)(1− T2) . (9)
The total transmission T ≡ T1T2 has a maximum equal
to 3− 2√2 on this curve. Such a value corresponds to a
threshold of about 7.65dB of losses, to be compared with
the 3dB limit of the one-way protocol.
More strongly, we prove that this threshold remains
the same when we change the nature of the lossy chan-
nel attack from individual to collective. In the collective
attack, Eve keeps her output probes till the end of the
protocol, when she exploits all the classical information
exchanged by Alice and Bob to perform a final coherent
measurement on all her probes. In such a case, the key
rate is bounded by IAB −χE where χE is the Holevo in-
formation of the ensemble ρE =
∫
G(Q)ρE(Q)dQ, where
ρE(Q) is the Eve’s state conditioned to Alice’s encoding
Q, and G(Q) is a Gaussian distribution with variance〈
Q2
〉
= V . For high modulation and Ti 6= 0, 1, one can




























and, therefore, the threshold condition IAB = χE gives
the same curve of Eq. (9). In other words, the security
threshold against collective attacks based on pure losses
is again 7.65dB [23].
In order to make a simple and direct comparison
among the various two-way protocols of Fig. 3, we also
test the heterodyne protocol (b2) and the dense-coding
protocol (c2) against collective attacks based on pure
losses. In the protocol (b2), Bob detects both the
quadratures with the aim of doubling the rate of key dis-
tribution. However, this improvement would exist only
in the ideal case of a lossless channel, while it rapidly
vanishes in presence of losses. In fact, Bob has now a
less efficient way to decode Alice’s information due to
the vacuum entering the unused ports of his beam split-
ters (see Fig. 3). This vacuum becomes more and more
destructive when the signal is progressively damped by
the losses on the channel. This is the reason why the
threshold of this protocol is found to be worse than be-
fore, even if much better than the corresponding one-way
protocol. For high modulation (and Ti 6= 0, 1), one has








From the condition IAB = χE one finds the curve
T2(1− T1T2) = e(1− T1)(1− T2) . (13)
On this curve the total transmission T ≡ T1T2 has a max-
imum equal to e(e + 4)−1, corresponding to a threshold
of about 3.93dB. Such a value must be compared with
the threshold of 1.4dB found for the corresponding one-
way protocol (b1) against collective lossy channel attacks
[24]. Also in this case the superadditivity of the security
threshold is clearly shown.
The protocol (b2) has the remarkable property to be
fully realizable using coherent states, but this property is
lost when we change Bob’s measurement and we consider
the Bell-like measurement of the dense coding protocol
(c2). This measurement removes the unwanted vacuum
noises entering Bob’s beam splitters and, therefore, en-
ables a more efficient decoding of Alice’s information. By
adopting this joint measurement, Bob extends the effi-
cient decoding strategy of the protocol (a2) from one to
both quadratures, and therefore he is able to achieve a
security threshold better than before. However, the cor-
responding increase in the complexity of the protocol is
non-trivial. In fact, the beam splitter used for the Bell
measurement has a transmission G equal to 1/2 only in
the case of a lossless channel, for which we have exactly
the dense coding scheme of Ref. [19]. In the non-trivial
cases, one can easily prove that the optimal transmission
G for signal decoding depends on the total transmission
T via the relation G = T (1+T )−1. Since the exact value
of G is known to Bob only after the error analysis of the
channel, he must keep all the states till the end of the
protocol, when he will be able to perform the relevant
Bell-like measurement. By adopting the optimal value








for high modulation (and Ti 6= 0, 1). As expected, this
value exactly doubles the mutual information of Eq. (11),
relative to the protocol (a2). On the other hand, Eve’s
information χE is exactly the same of the protocol (b2)
and given in Eq. (12). It follows that the threshold con-
dition IAB = χE gives the curve
2T2 = e(1− T1)(1− T2) , (16)
which leads to a maximum of about 0.21 for the total
transmission T . Note that such a value corresponds to
about 6.75dB, so that protocol (c2) outperforms pro-
tocol (b2) but does not reach the same performance of
protocol (a2). Actually, the security performances of the
homodyne protocol (a2) against lossy channel attacks
are not reproducible by any two-way protocols based on
a joint measurement of the quadratures. In fact, even if
we allow Bob to perform a final coherent measurement
on all his states in order to retrieve the full signal (Q,P )
encoded by Alice, one can verify that his accessible in-







for high modulation and Ti 6= 0, 1 (see Appendix). An
upper bound to the security threshold will then be given
by χB − χE = 0. Using Eqs. (12) and (17), one gets the
same curve of Eq. (9) and, therefore, the same security
threshold 7.65dB of the protocol (a2). Such a value will
then represent an upper bound to all possible thresholds
that are achievable by adopting two-way protocols with
joint measurements. The possible advantages brought by
this kind of protocol comes out for low losses, where they
are able to increase the rate of key distribution. In such a
case, in fact, their rate is comparable with Eq. (17), and
this value roughly doubles the low-loss rate of the two-
way protocol (a2), that is comparable with the mutual
information of Eq. (11).
6In conclusion, multi-way quantum cryptography repre-
sents a new environment to develop both novel and pre-
existing quantum key distribution protocols. Here, we
have presented the fundamental blocks of this new en-
vironment, the simplest non-trivial TM protocols, which
are the ones based on two-way quantum communication.
We have then studied their security against Gaussian at-
tacks. We have first derived the optimal individual attack
which can be constructed from the known optimal strate-
gies and, then, we have tested all the protocols against
collective attacks based on pure losses. In each case, we
have proved the superadditive behavior of the security
threshold which makes the two-way quantum cryptogra-
phy profitably more secure.
APPENDIX
Estimators and remote state preparation
Consider the general scenario where Alice and Bob
share two modes A and B, whose quadratures ~ξ ≡
(QA, PA, QB, PB) satisfy the canonical commutation re-












Suppose that modes A and B are described by a bipartite
Gaussian state ρAB, with displacement d ≡ 〈~ξ〉 set to
zero and correlation matrix V, where Vlm ≡ 〈ξlξm +
ξmξl〉/2. This real and symmetric matrix must satisfy
the Heisenberg principle
V + iJ ≥ 0 , (19)





〉 ≥ 1 for the diagonal
elements. All the quantum and/or classical correlations
between the modes are described by this matrix which
we assume to be completely known to the parties.
Then, suppose that Alice homodynes mode A and Bob
homodynes mode B, and they project onto the same
quadrature, e.g. Q. Thanks to the shared correlations,
Alice is then able to infer on Bob’s outcome QB from the
outcome QA of her measurement [14]. In fact, from QA
Alice can construct the optimal estimator Q
(A)
B ≡ κQA
of the variable QB where κ ≡ 〈QAQB〉〈Q2A〉−1 is di-
rectly computable from the correlation matrix. After
her estimation, Bob’s variable QB, with initial variance
VQB ≡ 〈Q2B〉, will be reduced to the conditional variable
QB|A ≡ QB −Q(A)B with conditional variance

















〉− 〈QAQB〉2〈Q2A〉 . (20)
Thanks to Alice’s estimation, the Shannon entropy
H(QB) = (1/2) lnVQB of Bob’s variable has been
reduced to the conditional entropy H(QB|QA) =
(1/2) lnVQB |QA [22]. Therefore, the mutual information
of Alice and Bob will be given by







Now, if we do not consider Bob’s measurement, Alice’s
local measurement corresponds to a remote state prepa-
ration at Bob’s site. In fact, her measurement is a Gaus-
sian quantum operation that projects Bob’s mode onto a
Gaussian state which is centered in the point {Q(A)B , 0}
of phase space and has uncertainties equal to VQB |QA of
Eq. (20) and
VPB |PA ≥ V −1QB |QA , (22)
according to the Heisenberg principle of Eq. (19). More
generally, Alice can remotely prepare a Gaussian state
by making a joint measurement of her quadratures QA
and PA. For instance, she can perform a heterodyne de-
tection by inserting her mode A into a balanced beam
splitter and, then, by detecting quadratures Q+ and P−
of the output modes ‘±’ (see Fig. 2). From the out-
comes (Q+, P−), Alice can construct two optimal esti-
mators Q
(+)
B = ξ+Q+ and P
(−)
B = ξ−P−, so that Bob’s
variables QB and PB are reduced to the conditional
ones QB|+ ≡ QB − Q(+)B and PB|− ≡ PB − P (−)B with
conditional variances VQB |Q+ and VPB |P− (computable
from the correlation matrices of ρ+B and ρ−B according
to Eq. (20)). In other words, Alice remotely prepares
a Gaussian state centered in {Q(+)B , P (−)B } with uncer-
tainties VQB |Q+ and VPB |P− In particular, if the shared
Gaussian state ρAB is an EPR source with variance V
(see Eq. (1)) then VQB |Q+ = VPB |P− = 1, and there-





B ]/2. Due to the probabilistic behavior of
the measurement, amplitude γ represents a complex ran-
dom variable over many instances of the process. Such a
variable follows a Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and second moments given by 〈Q(+)2B 〉 = 〈P (−)2B 〉 = V −1
and 〈Q(+)B P (−)B 〉 = 0. Therefore, the physical scheme
where Alice and Bob share an EPR source with vari-
ance V and Alice heterodynes her mode is equivalent
to a black-box where Alice prepares a coherent state
whose amplitude is modulated by a Gaussian distribu-
tion with variance V − 1. In this sense, prepare and
measure schemes using coherent states are equivalent to
EPR schemes.
Computation of the relevant entropies
Consider the case of a collective lossy channel attack
against the protocol (a2), where Eve exploits two beam
7splitters of transmission T1 and T2 (see Fig. 4) and per-
forms a final coherent measurement on all her probes.
Eve’s output modes E′1, E
′
2 are described by a state
ρE(Q) which is conditioned to Alice’s encoding Q. On
average, Eve gets an ensemble ρE =
∫
G(Q)ρE(Q)dQ,
where G(Q) is a Gaussian distribution with variance〈
Q2
〉
= V . The Holevo information of Eve is then equal
to χE = SE − SE|A, where SE and SE|A are the Von
Neumann entropies of ρE and ρE(Q), computable from
the correlation matrices VE and VE|A of such Gaussian








µ1 ≡ T1 + (1− T1)V , (24)
µ2 ≡ 1 + T1(1− T2)(V − 1) , (25)
θ ≡
√
T1(1− T1)(1− T2) (V − 1) , (26)
and






In the previous correlation matrix of Eq. (23), the off-
diagonal element θ disappears only in the trivial case
V = 1, in which case the correlation matrix VE fully
collapses into a direct sum, and the corresponding Eve’s
state factorizes as ρE = ρ1 ⊗ ρ2. For arbitrary V > 1
instead, this is not possible and Eve cannot remove the
correlation between her output probes.
The Von Neumann entropy SE of the Gaussian state
ρE can be computed from the symplectic eigenvalues [26]




























Note that, for x → +∞, the latter function adopts the
asymptotic expression [24]
g(x)→ 1 + ln(x/2) +O(x−1) . (30)
Since VE = V12 ⊕ I⊕ I, we have that
ν1 = ν− , ν2 = ν+ , ν3 = ν4 = 1 , (31)
where ν± are the symplectic eigenvalues of V12. For non
trivial attacks (Ti 6= 0, 1) and high modulation (V →
+∞) the symplectic eigenvalues ν± become proportional
to V , and one has
ν+ν− =
√
detV12 → (1 − T1)(1− T2)V 2 . (32)
In the same limit, the entropy becomes













(1 − T1)(1 − T2)
]
. (33)
The conditional entropy SE|A can be computed from
the symplectic eigenvalues of the matrix VE|A. It is easy
to verify that VE|A can be derived from VE by setting









(1 − T1)(1 − T2)(1− T1T2)
]
, (34)
so that χE is equal to Eq. (10).
Consider now a collective lossy channel attack against
the protocol (b2). Eve’s entropy SE is the same as be-
fore, while the partial entropy SE|A is now conditioned
to both Alice’s variables Q and P . For this reason,
such entropy derives from a conditional correlation ma-
trix VE|A which is computed from VE by setting Ω(0, 0)
in Eq. (23). For non-trivial attacks and high modulation,
one finds







and, therefore, the Holevo information χE is conse-
quently equal to Eq. (12). Since Eve’s entropies do not
depend on Bob’s measurements but only on Alice’s en-
coding, the result for χE is the same for the protocol
(c2).
In the end, consider again a collective lossy channel
attack with beam splitters T1 and T2, but now allow Bob
to perform a final coherent measurement on all his states,
from which he tries to to retrieve the full signal γ =
(Q+ iP )/2 encoded by Alice. Bob’s modes r and B′ are
described by a state ρB(γ) which is conditioned to Alice’s
encoding γ. On average, Bob gets an ensemble ρB =∫
G(γ)ρB(γ)d









= V and 〈QP 〉 = 0. The Holevo
information of Bob is then equal to χB = SB − SB|A,
where the two Von Neumann entropies SB and SB|A are
computable from the correlation matrices of the states
ρB and ρB(γ) exactly as before. One can verify that ρB










T1T2(V 2 − 1) , (37)
ς ≡ 1 + T1T2(V − 1) , (38)
and
Ω(V ) = T2V . (39)
8For non-trivial attacks and high modulation, the sym-
plectic eigenvalues of VB become proportional to V and,
therefore, the entropy becomes

















On the other hand, the correlation matrix VB|A of ρB(γ)
can be computed by inserting Ω(0) in Eq. (36). In the
usual limit, we have ν− = 1 and ν+ → V (1 − T1T2) so
that







From Eqs. (40) and (41), one easily gets the Eq. (17) for
the Holevo information χB.
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